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An Assessment of the Use of
Cost-Benefit Analysis
in Regulatory
Agency Decision Making*

Michael S. Baram**

CONSIDERABLE dissatisfaction has been expressed with the process
and results of regulatory agency decision making. Recommendations
have been made that the Federal agencies employ rational, "balancing"
approaches such as cost-benefit analysis in conducting their standardsetting and adjudicatory functions.
This paper examines some current uses of cost-benefit analysis by several agencies in their decision-making processes, and identifies and discusses apparent limitations.
Statutory and JudicialRequirements

Statutes enacted by the U.S. Congress provide the frameworks for
regulatory decision making by the Federal agencies and prescribe, usually in general terms, several criteria and considerations to be employed
by the agencies in carrying out their discretionary and mandatory functions. Such statutes commonly impose on an agency the requirement
simultaneously to consider technical and economic feasibility charac*This article is reprinted from Retrospective Technology Assessment, San Francisco
Press, Inc. The style of the footnotes have been changed to conform to the style used
in IDEA.
**Professor of Law at the Franklin Pierce Law Center and partner, on leave, of the law
firm of Bracken, Selig and Baram, Boston, Massachusetts.
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teristics and health and environmental effects in their decision-making
processes to establish standards, issue licenses, or take other agency action. This responsibility to consider such diverse factors simultaneously
may be imposed by a single statute on an agency, or by a set of statutes
enacted over time, all of which may apply to a single agency.
Comprehensive statutes to control externalities, such as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the Consumer Protection Act, the Noise Pollution Control Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA) are examples of Congressional
enactments that call for agency consideration of such factors in decision
making. Statutes governing resource development and management by
Federal agencies, such as the Outer Continental Shelf and the Submerged Lands Acts, the Reclamation and the Water Resource Acts, and
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended) also impose similar
requirements for decision making on the Federal departments and independent agencies.
Judicial review of agency decision making under these statutes has
been particularly rigorous and has had the effect of insuring that Federal agencies comply with such multiple-criteria requirements in their
decision processes. For example, NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act,' which apply to all agencies, have been judicially interpreted
2
as requiring agency use of "balancing analysis" (Calvert Cliffs v. AEC)
3
and "substantial inquiry" (Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe)
by agencies in their decision-making processes, thereby requiring that
all relevant factors such as economic and technical feasibility, and
health and environmental effects, must be simultaneously considered.
The agencies have therefore sought to develop and apply new techniques for decision making that can satisfy these statutory and judicial requirements for balancing multiple factors, such as cost-benefit
analysis.
Agency Implementation
Agencies are now turning to cost-benefit analysis in an effort to comply with statutory and judicial requirements. Cost-benefit is a relatively
NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321-4361) and APA (5 U.S.C. 500-576) are generically applicable
to all agencies of the Federal government, and similar statutes have been enacted
in many states for applicability to state agency regulatory activities.
2 In Calvert Cliffs, the D.C. Court of Appeals required that agencies use the results of
their environmental impact assessments under NEPA in "balancing analyses" to
reach their final determinations. [449 F.2d 1109 (1971).]
3 In Overton Park, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with the need for compiling a full,
adequate record to support agency decisions. [401 U.S. 402 (1971).]
1
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simple technique for decision making, and has been extensively used by
the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and other departments and agencies in the design of water-resource programs, dams, and
flood-control and other projects. Engineers and economists are therefore
experienced in the application of the technique to developmental purposes. Congress has promoted its use in water-resource programs4
Resources Council.
through the creation and activation of the Water
Further, the courts have not objected to the use of the technique per se
as a method of reaching balanced decisions in such developmental programs, have generally been unwilling to substitute their judgment for
that of the agency on developmental matters which involved the application of the technique, and have usually stated that alleged deficiencies
in such uses of cost-benefit is a matter for Congressional review in annual authorization and appropriation hearings held by several Congressequential elements of these long-term
sional committees on the
5
developmental programs.
Quite recently, use of cost-benefit has been undertaken by regulatory
agencies as well, in their decision making to set standards, issue
licenses, and reach siting and other regulatory and nondevelopmental
decisions. These agencies include, for example, the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Several committees of the National Academy of Sciences, the
Academy itself, and other advisory and professional associations have
recommended further use of the technique by these and other regulatory
agencies as the most feasible method for bringing about rational decision
making. Social scientists and economists have worked on further
development of the technique to enable its users to accommodate qualitative or not readily quantifiable considerations.
Chief among the several regulatory agencies to adopt the technique,
provide in their regulations for its use, and employ it as a matter of
course in their decision making is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC). NRC now employs cost-benefit in setting radiation standards "as
low as practicable," and in its licensing of nuclear facility construction

4

5

The Water Resources Planning Act, 43 U.S.C. 1962, created the Council. See
generally, U.S. Water Resources Council, Summary and Analyses of Public Response to Proposed Principlesand Standardsfor PlanningWater and Related Land
Resources and DraftEnvironmental Statement, July 1972.
See, for example, EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (1971); Conservation
Council of North Carolina v. Froehle, 340 F. Supp. 222 (1972); and discussion in
Hillhouse, Federal law of water resources development in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
Law (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974) at 872-873.
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and operation.6 The Environmental Protection Agency has also promulgated regulations requiring that the technique be used for the
establishment of other radiation standards and for the setting of emission standards for toxic chemicals under the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972. The Consumer Product Safety Commission
and several other agencies have not formally acknowledged use of the
technique, but recognize that the technique or a rough equivalent is
used in its decision processes. 7 Implementation of the National
Environmental Policy Act by various agencies, in accordance with the
Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality,8 has brought about
further adoption and use of the technique in certain agency decisionprocesses (Table 1).
Use of a new technique on this scale for national decision making on
matters involving the management of risks may have unforeseen and
undesirable implications. The time is ripe to directly address the
implications of using cost-benefit in regulatory decision making, before
such implications become manifest.
Issues for Evaluation
The use of cost-benefit analysis by regulatory agencies raises several
issues that deserve study, so that appropriate corrective measures may
be taken in time to avoid undesirable societal consequences. Discussion
of these issues is briefly presented here. Note that most of these issues
are inherent in any regulatory decision process, but are most urgently
and clearly raised when regulation is based on cost-benefit.
a. Identification of Costs and Benefits. The identification of costs and
benefits may appear to be a relatively simple task, but in reality is an
immature art. The Leopold, Sorenson, and GSA matrices9 are of some
use as checklists of some possible effects that may attend the construction of discrete projects, but are inadequate to the task of identifying the
effects of a standard (for radiation, for example) that may have national
and global consequences over long time frames. To what extent will
agency regulatory processes provide adequate notice to potentially af6 See generally, 10 C.F.R. 20, 10 C.F.R. 50, and other sections of NRC's regulations,

particularly Appendix 1 to 10 C.F.R. issued in 1975. For discussion, see Consideration of Health Benefit-cost Analysis for Activities Involving Ionizing RadiationEx-

posure and Alternatives, Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences (BEIR
Committee), 1977.
7 Findings based on interviews with personnel of various agencies.
8 CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. 1500 (1973).

9 For discussion ofmatrix methods, seeReview ofDecisionMethodologiesforEvaluating
Regulatory Actions Affecting Public Health and Safety, Chap. 6, Battelle Northwest

Laboratories, Report BNWL-2158 (1976).
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TABLE 1
ECONOMIC BENEFIT/COST ANALYSIS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS

Agriculture
Forest Service
Soil Conservation Service
Commerce
Defense
Air Force
Army
Navy
Corps of Engineers
Health, Education, and Welfare
Food and Drug Administration
Housing and Urban Development
Interior
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Land Management
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation
Bureau of Reclamation
Fish and Wildlife Service
National Park Service
Geological Survey
Justice
Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration
Labor
State
Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration
Federal Highway
Administration
Treasury
Energy Research and
Development Administration
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Power Commission**
General Services Administrationt
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

*

Prepared

Included

Generally
Yes
Yes
Sometimes
Yes
Sometimes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
Summarized
Yes
Yes
No
Sometimes
Summarized
Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
Often
Occasionally
Yes
No
No
No

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Yes
No
No
Not usually

Yes
No
No
When prepared

Not usually

When prepared

Not usually
Not usually

When prepared

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Souce: Council on Environmental Quality. Environmental Impact Statements: An Analysts of Siv
Years Experience by Sevenhy FederalAgencies. Washington. D.C.. 1976.
**FtC prepares comparative economic-analysis and cost-effectivene&s studies on proposed actions but
does not conduct classic benefit-cost studies.
tGSA does a cost evaluation, but an "economic benefit/cost" analysis is not always included or attached to the EIS.
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fected interests and enable them to play a role in the identification process?
To what extent will it be possible to identify significant long-term
effects by means of the various assessment techniques we now possess
or can develop? To what extent will the characterization of effects as
costs or benefits reflect establishment values and the status quo and
ignore changing values and behavior (e.g., the NRC's characterization of increased energy supply as of virtually unlimited benefit at a
time of increased concern about the need to conserve energy and fuel
resources and move to small technologies)?
b. Measurement and Quantification of Costs and Benefits. Similar
uncertainties arise regarding the capacity of regulatory agencies
adequately to measure and value costs and benefits, particularly
those which cannot be properly valued by the marketplace or
economic processes. Can we measure or value such effects as carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, teratogenicity, consumer convenience, or the
perpetuation of certain aspects of certain lifestyles such as mobility?
Are we ready to accept the valuation of $1000 per man-rem promulgated in 1975 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to
conduct its cost-benefit analyses and set standards for ionizing
radiation?' ° Should such values be commonly adopted by all agencies
with regulatory jurisdiction over different aspects of the same problem, such as EPA and FDA, which share with NRC to some extent
control over ionizing radiation? By what legal procedure shall we set
such values? To what extent shall we enable various interests to play
a role in the objective measurement and subjective valuation processes? Who will represent the unborn (future generations) in the valuation of mutagenic and other future effects, which arise from standards
established by NRC and EPA for radiation and toxic materials?
c. Consideration of DistributionalEffects. Closely associated with
the foregoing issues is the need to consider adequately distributional
effects of agency decision making based on cost-benefit. Clearly the
adverse effects of radiation emitted from nuclear power plants in accordance with NRC standards will fall most heavily on those living in
the environs of the power plants, but this distributional effect pattern
is not adequately recognized in the NRC's use of cost-benefit analysis.
How shall we safeguard the interests of these impacted groups and
others such as the poor, the primitive, and the unborn?
d. Determination of Appropriate Weighting Factors. A facile solution to the issues of quantification and distributional effects is the
10

See NRC's Appendix I, supra note 6.
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use of weighting factors in cost-benefit analysis. How shall we set and
determine the adequacy of such factors, in light of conflicting values
and varying attitudes about the distributional patterns, and citizen
willingness to accept certain probabilities of risks?
e. Post-hoc Considerations and Enforcement. After using costbenefit to establish regulatory actions, it can be assumed that unintentional and intentional violations of the prescribed regulations will
occur. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has learned that despite
its application of radiation standards (developed by use of costbenefit) to utilities, violations occur, such as excessive accidental releases of radioactive effluents. How to enforce or otherwise act on the
basis of such violations when, despite the unforeseen increased costs,
the economic viability of the regulated party and the needs of dependent consumers are at stake: plant shutdown, the imposition of new
safeguards (retrofitting), or waiver of requirements? In other words,
is the cost-benefit basis for designing and regulating power plants, in
this case, enforceable once the plants have been built and are in
operation?"
f. Structural-politicalConsiderations. In light of the foregoing issues, what structural-political considerations should be addressed?
Again, to consider the experience of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the cost-benefit analysis used to approve the construction and
operation of a new facility is premised on a specific population dose of
2
radiation and its valuation.' Yet the Commission lacks the authority
to control population density and migration in regions off-site from
the plant, and the States are reluctant and/or incapable of maintaining the population subject to exposure at the density levels used in
the calculations for initial approval of the facility. Will such structural-political developments proceed concurrently with the use of
cost-benefit to assure its efficacy and enforceability over time?
Further, in light of the valuation and distributional issues noted earlier, what political developments will be necessary and achievable to
enable meaningful participation or representation of various constituencies including the unborn?
g. Technology-forcing Considerations. If the emitted substance to
be controlled to some degree by cost-benefit regulation is always
going to be harmful to some, such as is the case for radiation and for
toxic chemicals with linear dose-response relationships, the objective
of regulation is to force the development and application of new tech11 See discussion in Chap. 4 of NAS-BEIR report, supra note 6.
12

See supra note 6.
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nologies to provide more effective limitation of releases on the sources
of such pollutants, over time. To what extent will the use of costbenefit for establishing regulations and prescribing control technologies retard the technology-forcing function? Information on control technologies is more available to industry than to government; in
the past, industry has presented pessimistic data on the feasibility
and costs of new technological developments to government agencies
(e.g., auto emission technologies). 13 How shall we assure the adequacy of the data and opinion on such technological developments, so
that cost-benefit does not become a tool for conveniently maintaining
the status quo on control technology, nor be used to stultify the forcing of new control developments?
h. Ethical Limitations. What constitutional and ethical limitations
will be applicable to the use of cost-benefit? How will due process,
equal protection and other legal and ethical concepts apply to the
conduct of regulation by cost-benefit? Is it ethical to use an economic
method which requires valuation in order to establish the quality of
life of this and future generations?
In another hazard or safety context, that of vehicular safety regulation, it has been noted that:
If... the principal benefits anticipated are the savings in lives and/or
reductions in the frequency or severity of injuries which cannot be reasonably quantified in monetary units, serious theoretical and conceptual difficulties arise .... Virtually all cost-benefit studies involving the loss of
life or limb have assigned fixed monetary values... typically obtained
either by computing the discounted future income of individuals or by
computing the discounted differences between future earnings and personal consumption. These concepts and approaches have been criticized on
a number of grounds ....
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has expressed a similar [critical] view. In its recent notice of proposed rule-making
concerning school bus crashworthiness, the agency stated that it 'has conducted conventional cost-benefit studies on school bus safety, but the normal valuation techniques evidently do not adequately reflect general public opinion on the importance of protecting children from death or injury.
It is obvious from the voluminous mail and Congressionalinterest that society places a higher value on the safety of its children than a conventional
cost-benefit analysis would indicate...' [B]ecause of the major conceptual
and methodological difficulties in the valuation of life and limb, costbenefit studies will be appropriate only in the decision-making processes
involving standards not primarily intended to save lives and reduce injuries - that is... standards to reduce property damage.
Congress recognized this distinction. Under Title I of the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act (P.L. 92-513, 1972) - principally intended to reduce property damage losses resulting from low-speed crashes
- it included a mandatory requirement for the Department of Trans13 See discussion in Chap. 4 of NAS-BEIR report, supra note 6.
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portation (DOT) to consider both the costs and benefits .... However, in
considering the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, (P.L.
89-563, 1966) which empowered DOT to set motor vehicle safety standards
aimed at reducing deaths and injuries, Congress rejected draft language
requiring such studies for safety standards. (Hearings Before Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S.H. Rep., 89th Congress, 2d Session, on HR 13228, "Part 2, Traffic Safety", p. 1203).

Similar Congressional rejection of cost-benefit for setting standards
and for other features of regulatory decision making, in/favor of the
determination of health parameters and other ambient effect-oriented
approaches, is found in the legislative history and enactments on
Clean Air and on Water Pollution Control. The Federal courts, in
reviewing regulatory agency decisions on pollutants with considerable health implications, have also demanded that health factors be
given a high priority in the thinking and nature of' such14 decisions,
indicating that cost-benefit alone would be inappropriate.
j. Accountability. To what extent will the use of cost-benefit
analysis promote the accountability of government decision makers to
the courts, the affected interests, and the public at large? Will the
jargon and arcane nature of the methodology retard lay understanding of agency decision processes? The cost-benefit approach of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission is complex and not easily comprehensible. The courts and other accountability mechanisms must be
evaluated in terms of their ability to cope with the advent of regulation based on cost-benefit. For example, the following balancing
analyses are all now potentially applicable to the NRC process of approving an application by a utility for a license to operate a nuclear
power facility:
(a) Use of cost-benefit by the NRC in promulgating agency standards and other rules of general applicability to power plant performance.
(b) Use of cost-benefit by the NRC in promulgating limitations for
a specific power plant for design approval.
(c) Use of balancing analyses in determining whether or not the
separate construction and operating licenses should be issued for a
specific plant.
For the first two steps, use of cost-benefit is mandated by the NRC's
15
Appendix I and other regulations. Alternately, the use of a "balanc-

14

See, for example, EDF v. Ruckelshaus 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

15 See supra note 6.
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ing analysis" is mandated by NEPA for all three steps when such
steps constitute "major actions" of environmental significance.
For the dual licensing procedures of the third step, the NEPA mandate for "balancing analyses" is clear; and a Federal court has recently cautioned that the NEPA requirement applicable to the issuance of an operating license may not be short circuited - that a
facility which meets NRC regulations does not concurrently and automatically qualify for licensing without the required weighing of
risks and benefits under NEPA. Nevertheless, for the specific case
before it, the court concluded that:
Apart from the requirements of NEPA or similar ones already implicit
under AEA [Atomic Energy Act], it would be pointless, and a waste of
agency resources, to require the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] to
reapply efforts that have already gone into its basic health and safety
regulations, in individual licensing proceeding, in the absence of some
evidence that a particular facility presents risks outside the parameters of
the original rule making. And in evaluating the sufficiency of agency
determinations in particular cases it would be stultifying formalism to
disregard the whole record and test AEC compliance by only the evidence
received at so-called "health and safety" hearings; or NEPA compliance
only on the basis of so-called "environmental" hearings.1 6

This judicial decision promotes administrative efficiency by eschewing duplication of balancing analyses, and seems to make good sense.
But it is clear that such efficiency is justified only when the risks and
benefits appropriate for the facility-licensing balancing task under
NEPA have been adequately considered in the prior balancing undertaken by the agency under its own regulations (e.g., NRC Appendix
1). Determination of these justifying circumstances is a complex task
which rests ultimately with the courts. The extent to which the courts
can handle this difficult task responsibly will therefore depend on
judicial willingness to examine the substantive features of agency decision processes, and the development of judicial expertise on costbenefit.
k. Modification and Alternatives to Cost-benefit. Finally, what modification or alternatives to cost-benefit should be considered, so that
the issues identified can be diminished? Will use of screening models,
multi-attribute analysis, and other progeny of cost-benefit reduce
some of the problems of valuation? Does cost-effectiveness analysis
provide a better method of simultaneously considering diverse factors
in regulatory decision making and also insuring that various socialwell being parameters are not breached by the regulated activities?
16 Citizens for Safe Power v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 6 E.L.R. 20095 (D.C.

Cir. 1975).
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This inventory of issues attending the use of cost-benefit analysis
in regulatory decision making indicates that research and public discussion on the subject at this time is a responsible and necessary
course of action, if future decision making is to be both rational and
humane.
Special Considerationsin the Regulation of Environmental
Carcinogens
a. Regulatory Patchwork. Responsibility for the regulation of
environmental carcinogens is scattered throughout many U.S.
government agencies today. So, as a toxic metal such as cadmium, or
an herbicide, or any other carcinogenic chemical wends its way
through the environment and food chain to its human receptors, it
passes through the jurisdiction of many agencies. But despite the
many watchdogs, the same carcinogen may elude certain critical controls because of serious regulatory omissions or gaps in legislated authority enacted by Congress.
The Federal agencies with primary regulatory responsibilities for
the control of environmental carcinogens are the Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Food and
Drug Administration, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. However, other agencies, ranging from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers to the Department of Transportation, also play
roles in the regulation of carcinogens. Each of these agencies has
statutory authority to regulate the use and emission of some of the
substances, from some of the sources, in some of the pathways, for the
purposes of protecting some of the population under some circumstances.
Each agency has its own objectives, analytical approaches,
databases, and control criteria, but often no agency has adequate authority or motivation to control at certain critical points. Substances
such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), implicated in cancer of the
liver, have therefore eluded coherent systematic control. To some extent, this gap may be the result of the agencies' failure to coordinate
or implement their functions properly. However, the primary problem
seems to be inadequate Congressional legislation, which has established agency functions in this inefficient and uncoordinated manner.
This regulatory patchwork results mainly from uncertainty as to
what constitutes cancer, the diversity of suspect substances and their
pathways to their victims, the many possible but difficult-to-test
synergistic factors, and the varied susceptibility of the affected population.
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Environmental carcinogens fall into several classes, traceable to
specific sources. The major classes of environmental carcinogens include the trace metals (beryllium, cadmium, etc.), synthetic and organic chemicals (DDT, FCBs, etc.), combustion products (aromatic
hydrocarbons), other chemical products (nitrites, asbestos, etc.), and
ionizing radiation from medical, industrial, and energy activities.
Each presumed carcinogen has its own environmental and commercial pathway from source to human receptor. Common pathways include air, water, soil, the food chain, drug use, and the direct application of medical and other services. Some human receptors are "voluntarily" exposed as consumers and workers, some are "bystanders"
who have not voluntarily subjected themselves to exposure, and some
fall into both categories. The human receptors vary in their susceptibility to cancer; the most susceptible include the very young, the
pregnant, and those who smoke cigarettes. The unborn are also extremely vulnerable to these substances and create a relatively new
and difficult class of receptors for the agencies to try to protect.
The specific contribution to human cancer of each substance and
each source, each pathway and causal relationship, the intervention
of exogenous and synergistic factors, and the adequacy of laboratory
and animal data and their extrapolation to humans are among the
myriad issues besetting government regulatory agencies. As a result,
the Federal agencies must grapple with the serious problems of legal
proof in their attempts to set standards. The same uncertainties confront the Federal courts when they review agency rule-making on
standards and other agency decisions.
b. The Analytical Pattern. At the heart of the regulatory confusion
in dealing with environmental cancer is the analytical method used
by the separate regulatory authorities. Many agencies employ a
"balancing process," in which the costs of establishing and maintaining any levels of emission and human exposure to a carcinogen are
balanced against the economic or social benefits accrued by the production and use of the substance. In some cases, agencies use a highly
formalized cost-benefit analysis. In other cases, the weighing of the
benefits and risks to society which would be incurred from the various levels of emissions and exposure is more informal. In either case,
the net risk or cost and the net benefit is estimated, valued, and
quantified before the agency determines which of several possible
levels of emission and exposure it should allow, in light of available
control techniques.
This balancing approach leads each agency to impose a limitation
or level of control on the source of an environmental carcinogen at the
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general point where costs or risks are equivalent to benefits. Some
agencies add margins of safety or weighting factors to their analysis,
either by choice or to satisfy statutory requirements.
The problems of such "balancing" approaches have been discussed
earlier in this paper, and include:
" What value should be placed on human life, illness, or suffering?
" Who should decide on such values?
" How should such values be determined?
" How are cases judged where benefits accrue to some but risks
accrue to others? How does one judge the distributional and equity
issues?
" How should we value the lives of the unborn?
" How reliable and objective are the designated costs of new control equipment, which are largely based on information from the industry to be regulated?
9 How accurate is the agency's assessment of benefits to society
from the activity in question?
These are significant problems for the balancing process, and at the
least, new techniques are badly needed to elicit public attitudes and
apply ethical safeguards to protect minorities and the unborn. For
example, when the Corps of Engineers proposes to use a chemical
herbicide to clear duckweed from navigational channels, and the EPA
approves the action (and thus approves the subsequent contamination
of the water, environment, and food chain), some relatively arbitrary
judgments have been made by the two agencies as to the probability
of human illness or death to be sanctioned, possibly resulting from
the originally beneficially intended use of the herbicide.
c. The Costs Add Up. Today's fragmented use of "balancing" by
individual regulators has a pernicious, cumulative effect over many
agencies' decisions. Each decision by each separate agency inevitably
rationalizes an additional contribution of carcinogens and risks to the
human environment. So each decision effectively increases the total
amount of environmental cancer. Such regulatory decisions occur
daily. These "justifiably" allowable risks could conceivably accumulate to the point where an entire present or future population could be
at substantial risk. Although each regulatory body is concerned only
with its own incremental contribution to future cases of environmental cancer, each incremental contribution adds to the number of
people whose lives will be affected.
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One may differ with this conclusion. The results of such incremental decisions may not be additive; there may be safe thresholds of
exposure within which no harm occurs; the analysis possibly assumes
an erroneous linear relationship between dose and response; perhaps
only the same, particularly susceptible human receptors will be at
risk, although their risk will be increasing. Nevertheless, some sort of
cumulative effect can be expected. Over time it will be substantial.
Taken to its logical extreme, our present fragmented uses of
"balancing" in regulation present an even more absurd scenario:
Each agency justifies its own small contribution to environmental
cancer on the ground that it constitutes only a minute fraction of all
cancer. (Some agencies, such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
have already adopted this logic.) But all agency regulations together
will create an environment in which the number of cancer cases has
increased. So, the Catch 22: as the number of victims of environmentally induced cancer grows ever larger, the significance of each
agency's contribution actually diminishes.
Therefore, an agency could conceivably justify an even greater contribution to environmental cancer in the future, and set even less
effective controls on the toxic substances it is required to regulate.
This scenario, though not yet realized, can be anticipated, given the
fragmentation of regulatory authority and the use of balancing in the
many small decisions made by the regulators. 17
Conclusions and Recommendations
The implications of using cost-benefit in regulation deserve
analysis far beyond the scope of this review, primarily because of our
increasing reliance on the technique to justify decisions which put the
health and safety of present and future generations at risk. Assuming
that this reliance will continue, we must rigorously review the
capabilities of Congress, the administrative agencies, and courts for
insuring that uses of the technique are socially appropriate on legal
and ethical grounds. We must reinforce the features of administrative
practice and judicial review that promote the accountability of those
employing the technique, and develop measures for evaluating uses of
the technique on specific regulatory matters. The central issue is our
capacity for social control of science and technology. We are learning
that our problems lie not with stereotypes of agencies and industries,
nor with "bad" technologies, but with our analytical and regulatory
17

For discussion of the issues raised in this section, see M. Baram, Regulation of
Environmental Carcinogens, 78 TECH. REv. (No. 8) at 40-42 (1976) and Chap. 4 of
NAS-Beir report, supra note 6.

